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Abstract
We formally study the problem of classification
under adversarial perturbations, both from the
learner’s perspective, and from the viewpoint of
a third-party who aims at certifying the robust-
ness of a given black-box classifier. We analyze
a PAC-type framework of semi-supervised learn-
ing and identify possibility and impossibility re-
sults for proper learning of VC-classes in this
setting. We further introduce and study a new
setting of black-box certification under limited
query budget. We analyze this for various classes
of predictors and types of perturbation. We also
consider the viewpoint of a black-box adversary
that aims at finding adversarial examples, show-
ing that the existence of an adversary with poly-
nomial query complexity implies the existence of
a robust learner with small sample complexity.
1. Introduction
We formally study the problem of classification under ad-
versarial perturbations. An adversarial perturbation is
an imperceptible alteration of a classifier’s input which
changes its prediction. The existence of adversarial per-
turbations for real-world input instances and typical clas-
sifiers (Szegedy et al., 2014) has contributed to a lack of
trust in predictive tools derived from automated learning.
Recent years have thus seen a surge of studies proposing
various heuristics to enhance robustness to adversarial at-
tacks (Chakraborty et al., 2018). Existing solutions can be
divided into two general categories: (i) those that modify
the learning procedure to increase the adversarial robust-
ness, for example by modifying the training data or the loss
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function used for training (Sinha et al., 2018; Cohen et al.,
2019; Salman et al., 2019), and (ii) post-hoc approaches
that aim to modify an already existing classifier to enhance
its robustness (Cohen et al., 2019).
A user of a predictive tool, however, may not oftentimes
be involved in the training of the classifier nor have the
technical access or capabilities to modify its input/output
behavior. Instead, the predictor may have been provided by
a third party and the user may have merely a black-box ac-
cess to the predictor. That is, the predictor h presents itself
as an oracle that takes input query x and responds with the
label h(x). The provider of the predictive tool, while not
necessarily assumed to have malicious intent, is still natu-
rally considered untrusted, and the user thus has an interest
in verifying the predictor’s performance (including adver-
sarial robustness) on its own application domain. While
the standard notion of classification accuracy can be easily
estimated using an i.i.d. sample generated from user’s data
generating distribution, estimating the expected robust loss
is not that easy: Given a labeled instance (x, y), the user
can immediately verify whether the instance is misclassi-
fied (h(x) 6= y) using a single query to h, but understand-
ing whether x is vulnerable under adversarial perturbations
may require many more queries to the oracle.
In this work, we introduce and analyze a formal model for
black-box certification under query access. We provide ex-
amples of hypothesis classes and perturbation types1 for
which such a certifier exists. We further generalize these
ideas and introduce the notion of a witness set for cer-
tification, where we identify general classes of problems
and perturbation types that admit black-box certification
with bounded query complexity. On the contrary, we also
demonstrate cases of simple classes where the query com-
plexity of certification is unbounded.
We further look at the problem from the viewpoint of the
adversary, connecting the query complexity of an adver-
sary (for finding adversarial examples) and that of the cer-
tifier. An intriguing question that we explore is whether
the sample complexity of learning a robust classifier with
respect to a hypothesis class is related to the query com-
1Defined in Section 2, a perturbation type encompasses the set
of admissible perturbations that the adversary is allowed to make
at each point.
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plexity of an optimal adversary (or certifier) for that class.
We uncover such a connection, showing that the existence
of a successful adversary with polynomial query complex-
ity for a hypothesis class means that we can robustly learn
that class with a rather small number of samples. For this,
we adapt a compression-based argument, demonstrating a
sample complexity upper bound for robust learning that is
smaller than what was previously known (Montasser et al.,
2019) (assuming that a polynomial adversary exists for that
class).
We start our investigations with the problem of robustly
(PAC-)learning classes of finite VC-dimension. It has been
shown recently that, while the VC-dimension characterizes
the proper learnability of a hypothesis class under the bi-
nary (misclassification) loss, there are classes of small VC-
dimension that are not properly learnable under the robust
loss (Montasser et al., 2019). We define the notion of the
margin class (associated with a hypothesis class and a per-
turbation type) and show that, if both the class and the mar-
gin class are simple (measured by their VC-dimension),
then proper learning under robust loss is not significantly
more difficult than learning with respect to the binary loss.
The corresponding complexity of the margin class, how-
ever, can be potentially quite large for specific choices
of perturbation types and hypothesis classes. We thus
investigate and provide scenarios where a form of semi-
supervised learning can overcome the impossibility of
proper robust learning even under general perturbation
types. We believe that our investigations of robust learnabil-
ity in these scenarios may help shed some light on where
the difficulty of general robust classification stems from.
1.1. Related work
Recent years have produced a surge of work on adver-
sarial attack (and defense) mechanisms (Madry et al.,
2018; Chakraborty et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017;
Dong et al., 2018; Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017;
Papernot et al., 2017; Akhtar & Mian, 2018; Su et al.,
2019), as well as the development of reference implemen-
tations of these (Goodfellow et al., 2018). Here, we briefly
discuss earlier studies focused on developing theoretical
understanding of adversarially robust learning.
Several recent studies have suggested and analyzed ap-
proaches of training under data augmentation (Sinha et al.,
2018; Salman et al., 2019). The general idea is to add ad-
versarial perturbations to data points already at training
time to promote smoothness around the support of the data
generating distribution. These studies then provide statis-
tical guarantees for the robustness of the learned classifier.
Similarly, statistical guarantees have been presented for ro-
bust training that modifies the loss function rather than the
training data (Wong & Kolter, 2018). However, the notion
of robustness certification used in these is different from
what we propose. While they focus on designing learning
methods that are certifiably robust, we aim at certifying an
arbitrary classifier and for a potentially new distribution.
The robust learnability of finite VC-classes has been stud-
ied only recently, often with pessimistic conclusions. An
early result demonstrated that there exist distributions
where robust learning requires provably more data than
its non-robust counterpart (Schmidt et al., 2018). Re-
cent works have studied adversarially robust classifica-
tion in the PAC-learning framework of computational
learning theory (Cullina et al., 2018; Awasthi et al., 2019;
Montasser et al., 2020) and presented hardness results
for binary distribution and hypothesis classes in this
framework (Diochnos et al., 2018; Gourdeau et al., 2019;
Diochnos et al., 2019). On the other hand, robust learning
has been shown to be possible under various assumptions.
It was shown to be possible for finite hypothesis classes
if the adversary also had a finite number of options for
corrupting the input (Feige et al., 2015). The assumption
on finite hypothesis classes was later relaxed to finite VC-
dimension of the hypothesis class in (Attias et al., 2019).
It has also been shown that robust learning is possible (by
robust Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM)) under a fea-
sibility assumption on the distribution and bounded cover-
ing numbers of the hypothesis class (Bubeck et al., 2019).
However, more recent work has presented classes of VC-
dimension 1, where the robust loss class has arbitrarily
large VC-dimension (Cullina et al., 2018) and, moreover,
where proper learning (such as robust ERM) is impossible
in a distribution-free finite sample regime (Montasser et al.,
2019). This latter work also presents an improper success-
ful learning scheme for any VC-class and any adversary
type, however with a sample complexity dependent on the
VC-dimension of the dual class (that is, potentially expo-
nential in the VC-dimension of the class).
We note that two additional aspects of our work have ap-
peared in the the literature before: considering robust learn-
ability by imposing computational constraints on an ad-
versary has been explored recently (Bubeck et al., 2019;
Gourdeau et al., 2019; Garg et al., 2019). Earlier work has
also hypothesized that unlabeled data may facilitate ad-
versarially robust learning, and demonstrated a scenario
where access to unlabeled data yields a better bound on the
sample complexity under a specific data generative model
(Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019).
Less closely related to our work, the theory of adversari-
ally robust learnability has been studied for non-parametric
learners. A first study in that framework showed that a near-
est neighbor classifier’s robust loss converges to that of the
Bayes optimal (Wang et al., 2018). A follow-up work then
derived a characterization of the best classifier with respect
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to the robust loss (analogous to the notion of the Bayes op-
timal), and suggested a training data pruning approach for
non-parametric robust classification (Yang et al., 2019).
1.2. Outline and summary of contributions
Setup and analyzing adversarial loss formulation In
Section 2, we provide the formal setup for the problem of
adversarial learning. We also decompose the adversarial
loss, and define the notion of the margin class associated
with a hypothesis class and a perturbation type (Def. 4).
Using unlabeled data for adversarial learning of VC-
classes In Section 3, we study the sample complexity
of proper robust learning. While this sample complexity
can be infinite for general VC-classes (Cullina et al., 2018;
Montasser et al., 2019; Yin et al., 2019), we show that VC-
classes are properly robustly learnable if the margin class
also has finite VC-dim (Thm. 7). We formalize an ideal-
ized notion of semi-supervised learning where the learner
has additional oracle access to probability weights of the
margin sets. We show that, perhaps counter intuitively, or-
acle access to both (exact) margin weights and (exact) bi-
nary losses, does not suffice for identifying the minimizer
of the adversarial loss in a class H (Thm. 9), even in the
0/1-realizable case (Thm. 12). However, under the addi-
tional assumption of robust realizability distributions in the
(idealized) semi-supervised proper learning becomes fea-
sible with bounded label complexity and unlabeled finite
samples can be beneficial (Thms. 10 and 11).
Blackbox certification with query access We formally
define the problem of black-box certification through query
access (Def. 15), and demonstrate examples where cer-
tification is possible (Obs. 16) or impossible (Obs. 17).
Motivated by this impossibility result, we also introduce
a tolerant notion of certification (Def. 19). We show
that while more classes are certifiable with this definition
(Obs. 20), some simple classes still remain impossible to
certify (Obs. 21). We identify a sufficient condition for cer-
tifiability of a hypothesis class w.r.t. a perturbation type
through the notion of witness sets (Def. 22 and Thm. 23).
We then consider the query complexity of the adversary (as
opposed to that of the certifier) for finding adversarial in-
stances (Def. 24, 25, and 26), showing the connection be-
tween the success of a non-adaptive adversary and the exis-
tence of a witness set (Obs. 27).
Connecting adversarial query complexity and VC-
learnability The culminating (and perhaps the most tech-
nical) result reconnects the two themes of our work: (PAC-
)learnability with respect to an adversarial loss and the
query complexity of an adversary. With Theorem 28,
we show the existence of a perfect adversary with small
query complexity implies small sample complexity of ro-
bust learning.
We include proof sketches of all our claims here, and re-
fer the reader to the supplementary material for detailed
proofs.
2. Setup and Definitions
We letX denote the domain (oftenX ⊆ Rd) and Y (mostly
Y = {0, 1}) a (binary) label space. We assume that data is
generated by some distributionP overX×Y and letPX de-
note the marginal of P over X . A hypothesis is a function
h : X → Y , and can naturally be identified with a subset of
X×Y , namely h = {(x, y) ∈ X×Y | x ∈ X, y = f(x)}.
Since we are working with binary labels, we also some-
times identify a hypothesis h with the pre-image of 1 under
h, that is the domain subset {x ∈ X | h(x) = 1}. We let
F denote the set of all Borel functions2 from X to Y (or
all functions in case of a countable domain). A hypothesis
class is a subset of F , often denoted byH ⊆ F .
The quality of prediction of a hypothesis on a labeled exam-
ple (x, y) is measured by a loss function ℓ : (F×X×Y )→
R. For classification problems, the quality of prediction is
typically measured with the binary loss
ℓ0/1(h, x, y) = 1 [h(x) 6= y] ,
where 1 [α] denotes the indicator function for predicate α.
For (adversarially) robust classification, we let U : X →
2X , the perturbation type, be a function that maps each
instance to the set of admissible perturbations at point x.
We assume that the perturbation type satisfies x ∈ U(x)
for all x ∈ X . If X is equipped with a metric dist, then
a natural choice for the set of perturbations at x is a ball
Br(x) = {z ∈ X | dist(x, z) ≤ r} of radius r around
x. For an x ∈ X and h ∈ H, we say that x′ ∈ U(x) is
an adversarial point of x with respect to h if h(x) 6= h(x′).
We use the following definition of the adversarially robust
loss with respect to perturbation type U
ℓU(h, x, y) = 1 [∃z ∈ U(x) : h(z) 6= y] .
If U(x) is always a ball of radius r around x, we will also
use the notation ℓr(h, x, y) = ℓBr(h, x, y). We assume that
the perturbation type is so that ℓU (f, ·, ·) is a measurable
function for all f ∈ F . A sufficient condition is that the
set U(x) are open sets (whereX is assumed to be equipped
with some topology) and the pertubation type further satis-
fies z ∈ U(x) if and only if x ∈ U(z) for all x, z ∈ X (see
Appendix B for a proof and an example of a simple pertur-
bation type that renders the the corresponding loss function
of a threshold predictor non-measurable).
2For an uncountable domain, we only consider Borel-
measurable hypotheses to avoid dealing with measurability issues.
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We denote the expected loss (or true loss) of a hypothesis
h with respect to the distribution P and loss function ℓ by
LP (h) = E(x,y)∼P [ℓ(h, x, y)]. In particular, we will de-
note the true binary loss by L0/1P (h) and the true robust
loss by LUP (h). Further, we denote the approximation error
of class H with respect to distribution P and loss function
ℓ by LP (H) = infh∈H LP (h).
The empirical loss of a hypothesis h with respect to loss
function ℓ and a sample S = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) is
defined as LS(h) = 1n
∑n
i=1 ℓ(h, xi, yi).
A learner A is a function that takes in a finite sequence of
labeled instances S = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) and outputs
a hypothesis h = A(S). The following is a standard no-
tion of (PAC-)learnability from finite samples of a hypoth-
esis class (Vapnik & Chervonenkis, 1971; Valiant, 1984;
Blumer et al., 1989; Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014).
Definition 1 ((Agnostic) Learnability). A hypothesis class
H is agnostic learnable with respect to set of distributions
P and loss function ℓ, if there exists a learner A such that
for all ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1), there is a sample size m(ǫ, δ) such
that, for any distribution P ∈ P , if the input to A is an iid
sample S from P of size m ≥ m(ǫ, δ), then, with probabil-
ity at least (1 − δ) over the samples, the learner outputs a
hypothesis h = A(S) with LP (h) ≤ LP (H) + ǫ.
The class is said to be learnable in the realizable case with
respect to loss function ℓ, if the above holds under the con-
dition that LP (H) = 0. We say that H is distribution-free
learnable (or simply learnable) if it is learnable when P is
the set of all probability measures over X × Y .
Definition 2 (VC-dimension). We say that a collection of
subsets G ⊆ 2X of some domain X shatters a subset B ⊆
X if for every F ⊆ B there existsG ∈ G such thatG∩B =
F . The VC-dimension of G, denoted by VC(G), is defined
to be the supremum of the size of the sets that are shattered
by G.
It is easy to see that the VC-dimension of a binary hypoth-
esis class H is independent of whether we view H as a
subset ofX × Y or pre-images of 1 (thus, subsets ofX). It
is well known that, for the binary loss, a hypothesis class is
(distribution-free) learnable if and only if it has finite VC-
dimension (Blumer et al., 1989). Furthermore, any learn-
able binary hypothesis class can be learned with a proper
learner.
Definition 3 (Proper Learnability). We call a learner A a
proper learner for the class H if, for all input samples S,
we have A(S) ∈ H. A class H is properly learnable if the
conditions in Definition 1 hold with a proper learnerA.
It has recently been shown that there are classes of finite
VC-dimension that are not properly learnable with respect
to the adversarially robust loss (Montasser et al., 2019).
2.1. Decomposing the robust loss
In this work, we adapt the most commonly used no-
tion of a adversarially robust loss (Montasser et al., 2019;
Yang et al., 2019). Note that, we have ℓU (h, x, y) = 1 if
and only if at least one of the following conditions holds:
• h makes a mistake on x with respect to label y, or
• there is a close-by instance z ∈ U(x) that h labels differ-
ent than x, that is, x is close to h’s decision boundary.
The first condition holds when (x, y) falls into the error
region, errh = (X × Y ) \ h. The notion of error region
then naturally captures the (non-adversarial) loss:
L0/1P (h) = P(x,y)∼P [(x, y) ∈ errh] = P (errh).
The second condition holds when x lies in the margin area
of h. The following definition makes this notion explicit.
Let h ∈ F be some hypothesis. We define the margin
area of h with respect to perturbation type U , as the sub-
set marUh ⊂ X × Y defined by
marUh = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | ∃z ∈ U(x) : h(x) 6= h(z)}
Based on these definitions, the adversarially robust loss
with respect to U is 1 if and only if the sample (x, y) falls
into the error region errh and/or the margin area mar
U
h of
h:
LUP (h) = P (errh ∪marUh ).
Definition 4. For class H, we refer to the collection
HUmar = {marUh | h ∈ H} as the margin class ofH.
While we defined that margin areas marUh as subsets of
X × Y , it is sometimes natural to identify them with their
projection onX , thus simply as subsets ofX .
Remark 5. We note that there is more than one way to
formulate a loss function that captures both classification
accuracy and robustness to small (adversarial) perturba-
tions. The notion we adopt has the property that even the
best classifier with respect to the binary loss (even an h
with L0/1P (h) = 0 if such exist) may have positive robust
loss, if the true labels themselves change within the adver-
sarial neighbourhoods. A natural alternative, also often
considered, is to require the adversary to find a neighbour-
ing point where the classifier returns an incorrect label (in-
stead of just a different label). However, we note that such
a notion cannot be phrased as a loss function ℓ(h, x, y)
(as it depends on the true label of the perturbed instance).
Previous studies have provided excellent discussions of the
various options. (Diochnos et al., 2018; Gourdeau et al.,
2019).
Semi-Supervised Learning (SSL) Since the margin ar-
eas marUh can naturally be viewed as subsets of X , their
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weights P (marUh ) under the data generating distribution
can potentially be estimated with samples from PX , that is,
from unlabeled data. A learner that takes in both a labeled
sample S from P and an unlabeled sample T from PX ,
is called a semi-supervised learner. For scenarios where
robust learning has been shown to be hard, we explore
whether this hardness can be overcome by SSL. We will
consider semi-supervised learners that take in labeled and
unlabeled data samples, and also idealized semi-supervised
learners that, in addition to a labeled data sample have or-
acle access to probability weights of certain subsets of X
(Go¨pfert et al., 2019).
3. Robust Learning of VC Classes
It has been shown that there is a class H of bounded
VC-dimension (VC(H) = 1 in fact) and a perturbations
type U such that H is not robustly properly learnable
(Montasser et al., 2019), even if the distribution is realiz-
able with respect to H under the U-robust loss. The per-
turbation type U in the lower bound construction can ac-
tually chosen to be balls with respect to some metric over
X = Rd (for any d, even d = 1). The same work also
shows that if a class has bounded VC-dimension, then it is
(improperly) robustly learnable with respect to any pertur-
bation type U .
Theorem 6 ((Montasser et al., 2019)).
1.) There is a classH over X = Rd with VC(H) = 1, and
a set of distributions P with LrP (H) = 0 for all P ∈ P ,
such thatH is not proper learnable over P with respect to
loss function ℓr.
2.) Let X be any domain and U : X → 2X be any type
of perturbation, and letH ⊆ {0, 1}X be a hypothesis class
with finite VC-dimension. Then H is distribution-free ag-
nostic learnable with respect to loss function ℓU .
While the second part of the above theorem seems to set-
tle adversarially robust learnability for binary hypothesis
classes, the positive result is achieved with a compression-
based learner, which has potentially much higher sam-
ple complexity than what suffices for the binary loss.
In fact, the size of the best known general compression
scheme (Moran & Yehudayoff, 2016) depends on the VC-
dimension of the dual class of H, making the sample
complexity of this approach generally exponential in VC-
dimension ofH.
We will now first show that the impossibility result in the
first part of the above theorem crucially depends on the
combination of the class H and a pertubation type U (de-
spite these being balls in a Euclidian space) so that the mar-
gin class HUmar has infinite VC-dimension. We prove that,
if both H and HUmar have finite VC-dimension then H is
(distribution-free) learnable with respect to the robust loss,
with a proper learner.
Theorem 7 (Proper learnability for finite VC and finite
margin-VC). Let X be any domain and H ⊆ F be a
hypothesis class with finite VC-dimension. Further, let
U : X → 2X be any perturbation type such thatHUmar has
finite VC-dimension. We set D = VC(H) + VC(HUmar).
Then H is distribution-free (agnostically) properly learn-
able with respect to the robust loss ℓU , and the sample com-
plexity is O
(
D log(D)+log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
.
Proof Sketch. We provide the more detailed argument in
the appendix. Recall that a set S ⊆ X × Y is said to be
an ǫ-approximation of P with respect to H ⊆ X × Y if
for all h ∈ H we have
∣∣∣P [h]− |h∩S||S|
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ, that is, if the
empirical estimates with respect to S of the sets in h are
ǫ-close to their true probability weights. Consider the class
of subsets G = {(errh ∪ marUh ) ⊆ X × Y | h ∈ H}
of point-wise unions of error and margin regions. A sim-
ple counting argument shows that VC(G) ≤ D log(D),
where D = VC(H) + VC(HUmar). Thus, by basic VC-
theory, a sample of size Θ
(
D logD+log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
will be an
ǫ-approximation of G with respect to P with probability at
least 1− δ. Thus any empirical risk minimizer with respect
to ℓU is a successful proper and agnostic robust learner for
H.
Observation 8. We believe the conditions of Theorem 7
hold for most natural classes and perturbation types U .
Eg. if H is the class of linear predictors in Rd and U are
sets of balls with respect to some ℓp-norm, then both H
and HUmar have finite VC-dimension (see also (Yin et al.,
2019)).
3.1. Using unlabeled data for robust proper learning
In light of the above two general results, we turn to investi-
gate whether unlabeled data can help in overcoming the dis-
crepancy between the two setups. In particular, under vari-
ous additional assumptions, we consider the case ofVC(H)
being finite but VC(HUmar) (potentially) being infinite and
a learner having additional access to PX .
We model knowledge of PX as the learner having access
to an oracle that returns the probability weights of various
subsets ofX . We say that the learner has access to amargin
oracle for class H if, for every h ∈ H, it has access (can
query) the probability weight of the margin set of h, that is
P (marUh ). Since the margin areas can be viewed as subsets
of X , if the margin class of H under perturbation type U
has finite VC-dimension, a margin oracle can be approxi-
mated using an unlabeled sample from the distribution P .
Similarly, one could define an error oracle for H as an or-
acle, that, for every h ∈ H would return the weight of
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the error sets P (errh). This is typically approximated with
a labeled sample from the data-generating distribution, if
the class has finite VC-dimension. This is similar to the
settings of learning by distances (Ben-David et al., 1995)
or learning with statistical queries (Kearns, 1998; Feldman,
2017).
To minimize the adversarial loss however, the learner needs
to find (through oracle access or through approximations by
samples) a minimizer of the weights P (errh ∪marUh ). We
now first show that having access to both an exact error
oracle and an exact margin oracle does not suffice for this.
Theorem 9. There is a class H with VC(H) = 1 over a
domainX with |X | = 7, a perturbation type U : X → 2X ,
and two distributions P 1 and P 2 over X × {0, 1}, that
are indistinguishable with error and margin oracles for H,
while their robust loss minimizers inH differ.
Proof. Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , x7} be the domain. We con-
sider two distributions P 1 and P 2 over X × {0, 1}. Both
have true label 0 on all points, that is P (y = 1|x) = 0 for
all x ∈ X . However their marginals P 1 and P 2 differ:
P 1X(x1) = P
1
X(x3) = 0, P
1
X(x2) = 2/6, and
P 1X(xi) = 1/6 for i ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}.
P 2X(x4) = P
2
X(x6) = 0, P
2
X(x5) = 2/6, and
P 2X(xi) = 1/6 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 7}.
The class H consists of two functions: h1 =
1 [x = x2 ∨ x = x3] and h2 = 1 [x = x5 ∨ x = x6]. Fur-
ther, we consider the following perturbation sets (for read-
ability, we first state them without the points themselves):
U˜(x1) = {x2}, U˜(x2) = {x1, x3}, U˜(x3) = {x2},
U˜(x4) = {x5}, U˜(x5) = {x4, x6}, U˜(x6) = {x5},
U˜(x7) = ∅
Now we set U(xi) = U˜(xi) ∪ {xi}, so that each point is
included in its own perturbation set. Now, both h1 and h2
have 0/1-loss 2/6 = 1/3 on both P 1 and P 2. And for both
h1 and h2 the margin areas have weight 2/6 = 1/3 on both
P 1 and P 2. However, the adversarial loss minimizer for
P 1 is h1 and for P
2 is h2 (by a gap of 1/6 each).
While impossibility result in the above example, of course,
can be overcome by estimating the weights of the seven
points in the domain, the construction exhibits that merely
estimating classification error and weights of margin sets
does not suffice for proper learning with respect to the ad-
versarial loss. The example shows, that the learner also
needs to take into account the interactions (intersections
between the sets) of the two components of the adversar-
ial loss. However the weights of intersection errh ∩marUh ,
inherently involve label information.
In the following subsection we show that realizability with
respect to the robust loss implies that robust learning be-
comes possible with access to a (bounded size) labeled sam-
ple from the distribution and additional access to a mar-
gin oracle or a (bounded size) unlabeled sample. In the
appendix Section C.3, we further explore weakening this
assumption to only require 0/1-reazability with access to
stronger version of the margin oracle.
3.1.1. ROBUST REALIZABILITY:
∃h∗ ∈ H WITH LUP (h∗) = 0
This is the setup of the impossibility result for proper learn-
ing (Montasser et al., 2019). We show that proper learning
becomes possible with access to a margin oracle forH.
Theorem 10. LetX be some domain,H a hypothesis class
with finite VC-dimension and U : X → 2X any perturba-
tion type. If a learner is given additional access to a margin
oracle for H, then H is properly learnable with respect to
the robust loss ℓU and the class of distributions P that are
robust-realizable by H, LUP (H) = 0, with labeled sample
complexity O˜(VC(H)+log(1/δ)ǫ )
Proof Sketch. By the robust realizability, there is an h∗ ∈
H with LUP (h∗) = 0 implying that L0/1P (h∗) = 0,
that is, the distribution is (standard) realizable by H.
Basic VC-theory tells us that an iid sample S of size
Θ˜
(
VC(H)+log( 1
δ
)
ǫ
)
guarantees that all functions in the ver-
sion space of S (that is all h with L0/1S (h) = 0) have true
binary loss at most ǫ (with probability at least 1− δ). Now,
with access to a margin oracle for H a learner can remove
all hypotheses with P (marUh ) > 0 from the version space
and return any remaining hypothesis (at least h∗ will re-
main).
Note that the above procedure crucially depends on actual
access to a margin oracle. The weights P (marUh ) cannot
be generally estimated if HUmar has infinite VC-dimension,
as the impossibility result for proper learning from finite
samples shows. Thus proper learnability even under these
(strong) assumptions cannot always be manifested by a
semi-supervised proper learner that has access only to fi-
nite amounts of unlabeled data. We also note that the
above result (even with access to PX ) does not allow for
an extension to the agnostic case via the type of reductions
known from compression-based bounds (Montasser et al.,
2019; Moran & Yehudayoff, 2016).
On the other hand, if the margin class has finite, but poten-
tially much larger VC-dimension than H, then we can use
unlabeled data to approximate the margin oracle in Theo-
rem 10. The following result thus provides an improved
bound on the number of labeled samples that suffice for
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robust proper learning under the assumptions of Theorem
7.
Theorem 11. LetX be some domain,H a hypothesis class
with finite VC-dimension and let U : X → 2X be a pertur-
bation type such that the margin classHUmar also has finite
VC-dimension. If a learner is given additional access to an
(unlabeled) sample T from PX , then H is properly learn-
able with respect to the robust loss ℓU and the class of dis-
tributions P that are robust-realizable by H, LUP (H) = 0,
with labeled sample complexity O˜(VC(H)+log(1/δ)ǫ ) and un-
labeled sample complexity O˜(
VC(HU
mar
)+log(1/δ)
ǫ )
Proof. The stated sample sizes imply that all functions
in H in the version space of the labeled sample S have
true binary loss at most ǫ and all functions in H whose
margin areas are not hit by T have true margin weight
at most ǫ. The learner can thus output any function h
with 0 classification error on S and 0 margin weight un-
der T (at least h∗ will satisfy these conditions), and we get
LUh = P (errh ∪marUh ) ≤ 2ǫ.
The assumption in the above theorems states that there ex-
ists one function h∗ in the class that has both perfect clas-
sification accuracy and no weight in its margin area. The
proof of the impossibility construction of Theorem 9 em-
ploys a class and distributions where no function in the
class has perfect margin or perfectly classifies the task. We
can modify that construction to show that the “double re-
alizability” in Theorem 10 is necessary if the access to the
marginal should be restricted to a margin oracle forH. The
proof of the follwing result can be found in Appendix C.2.
Theorem 12. There is a class H with VC(H) = 1 over a
domainX with |X | = 8, a perturbation type U : X → 2X ,
and two distributions P 1 and P 2 over X × {0, 1}, such
that there are functions hr, hc ∈ H with L0/1P i (hr) = 0 and
P i(marUhc) = 0 for both i ∈ {1, 2}, while P 1 and P 2 are
indistinguishable with error and margin oracles forH and
their robust loss minimizers in H differ.
4. Black-box Certification and the Query
Complexity of Adversarial Attacks
Given a fixed hypothesis h, a basic concentration inequal-
ity (e.g., Hoeffding’s inequality) indicates that the empir-
ical loss of h on a samples S ∼ Pm, L0/1S (h), gives an
O(m−1/2)-accurate estimate of the true loss with respect
to P , L0/1P (h). In fact, in order to compute L0/1S (h), we do
not need to know h directly; it would suffice to be able to
query h(x) on the given sample. Therefore, we can say it is
possible to estimate the true binary loss of h up to additive
error ǫ usingO(1/ǫ2) samples fromP andO(1/ǫ2) queries
to h(.).
The high-level question that we ask in this section is
whether and when we can do the same for the adversarial
loss, LUP (h). If possible, it would mean that we can have a
third-party that “certifies” the robustness of a given black-
box predictor (e.g., without relying on the knowledge of the
learning algorithm that produced it)
Definition 13 (Label Query Oracle). We call an oracleOh
a label query oracle for a hypothesis h, if for all x ∈ X ,
upon querying for x, the oracle returns the label Oh(x) =
h(x).
Definition 14 (Query-based Algorithm). We call an algo-
rithm A : (⋃∞i=1X i,Oh)→ R a query-based algorithm, if
A has access to a label query oracleOh.
Definition 15 (Certifiablility). A classH is certifiable with
respect to U if there exists a query based algorithm A and
there are functions q,m : (0, 1)2 → N such that for every
ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1], every distribution P over X × Y , and every
h ∈ H, we have that with probability at least 1− δ over an
iid sample S ∼ PmX of sizem ≥ m(ǫ, δ)
|A(S,Oh) − LUP (h)| < ǫ
with a query budget of q(ǫ, δ) for A. In this case, we say
thatH admits (m, q) blackbox query certification.
In light of Section 2.1, the task of robust certification is to
estimate the probability weight of the set errh ∪marUh .
Observation 16. Let H be the set of all half-spaces in R2
and let U(x) = {z : ‖x − z‖1 ≤ 1} be the unit ball wrt
ℓ1-norm centred at x. Then H admits (m, q)-certification
under U for functionsm, q ∈ O(1/ǫ2).
Proof. Say we have a sample S ∼ PmX . For each point
x ∈ S define the set w(x) = {x + (0, 1), x + (1, 0), x +
(−1, 0), x + (0,−1)}, i.e., the four corner points of U(x).
The certifier can determine whether x ∈ errh by querying
the label of x; further it can determine whether x ∈ marUh
by querying all points in w(x). Let W = ∪x∈Sw(x). By
querying all points in S ∪W , the certifier can calculate the
robust loss of h on S. This will be an ǫ-accurate estimate
of LUP (h) whenm = O(1/ǫ
2).
We immediately see that certification is non-trivial, in that
there are cases where robust certification is impossible. The
proof can be found in Appendix D.
Observation 17. Let H be the set of all half-spaces in R2
and let U(x) = {z : ‖x − z‖2 ≤ 1} be the unit ball wrt
ℓ2-norm centred at x. ThenH is not certifiable under U .
This motivates us to define a tolerant certification version.
Definition 18 (Restriction of a perturbation type). Let
U ,V : X → 2X be a perturbation types. We say that U
is a restriction of V if U(x) ⊆ V(x) for all x ∈ X .
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Note that if U is a restriction of V , then, for all distributions
P and predictors h we have LUP ≤ LVP .
Definition 19 (Tolerant Certification). A class H is toler-
antly certifiable with respect to U and V , where U is a re-
striction of V , if there exists a query based algorithm A,
and there are functions q,m : (0, 1)2 → N such that for
every ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1], every distribution P over X × Y , and
every h ∈ H, we have that with probability at least 1 − δ
over an i.i.d. sample S ∼ PmX of size m ≥ m(ǫ, δ)
A(S,Oh) ∈ [LUP (h)− ǫ,LVP (h) + ǫ]
with a query budget of q(ǫ, δ) for A. In this case, we say
thatH admits tolerant (m, q) blackbox query certification.
Observation 20. Let U(x) = {z : ‖x − z‖2 ≤ 1} and
V(x) = {z : ‖x − z‖2 ≤ 1 + γ}. Let H be the set of
all half-spaces in R2. Then H is (O(1/ǫ2), O(1/√γǫ2))
tolerantly certifiable with respect to U and V .
Proof sketch. For each x, we can always find a regular
polygon with O(π/
√
γ) vertices that “sits” between the
U(x) and V(x). Therefore, in order to find out whether x is
adversarially vulnerable or not, it would suffice to make
O(π/
√
γ) queries. Combining this with Hoeffding’s in-
equality shows that if we sample 1/ǫ2 points from P and
makeO(π/
√
γ) queries for each, we can estimate LU ,VP (h)
within error ǫ.
Though more realistic, even the tolerant notion of certifi-
ability does not make all seemingly simple classes certifi-
able.
Observation 21. Let U(x) = {z : ‖x − z‖2 ≤ 1} and
V(x) = {z : ‖x− z‖2 ≤ 1+ γ}. There exists a hypothesis
classH with VC-dimension 1, such thatH is not tolerantly
certifiable with respect to U and V .
Proof sketch. For any p ∈ R2, let hp(x) = 1 [x = p]. Let
H = {hp : p ∈ R2}. H clearly has a VC-dimension of
1, but we claim that it is not tolerantly certifiable. We con-
struct an argument similar to Observation 17. The idea is
that no matter what queries the certifier chooses, we can
always set p to be a point that was not queried and is ei-
ther inside U or outside V depending on the certifier’s an-
swer.
4.1. Witness Sets for Certification
A common observation in the previous examples was that
if the certifier could identify a set of points whose labels de-
termined the points in S that were in the margin of h, then
querying those points was enough for robust certification.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 22 (Witness sets). Given a hypothesis class H
and a perturbation typeU , for any point x ∈ X , we say that
w(x) ⊂ X is a witness set for x if there exists a mapping
f : {0, 1}w(x) → {0, 1} such that for any hypothesis h ∈
H, f(h|w(x)) = 1 if and only if x lies in the margin of h
(where h|w(x) denotes the restriction of hypothesis h to set
w(x)).
Clearly, all positive examples above were created using wit-
ness sets. The following theorem identifies a large class of
H,U pairs that exhibit finite witness sets.
Theorem 23. For any x ∈ X , consider two partial or-
derings ≺x0 and ≺x1 over the elements of H where for
h1, h2 ∈ H, we say h1 ≺x1 h2 if U(x) ∩ h1 ⊂ U(x) ∩ h2,
and h1 ≺x0 h2 if U(x)\h1 ⊂ U(x)\h2. For both partial or-
derings we identify (as equivalent) hypotheses where these
intersections co-incide and further we remove all hypothe-
ses where the intersections are empty. 3 If both partial or-
ders have finite number of minima for each x, then the pair
H,U exhibits a finite witness set and hence is certifiable.
Proof. For this proof we will identify hypotheseswith their
equivalence classes in each partial ordering. LetM0(x) ⊂
H be the set of minima for ≺x0 and M1(x) ⊂ H for ≺x1 .
For each h ∈ M0(x), we pick a point x′ ∈ U(x) such that
x′ ∈ h but x′ /∈ h′ for any h′ ≻ h, thus forming a set
w0(x). Similarly, we define the set w1(x). We claim that
w(x) = w0(x)∪w1(x)∪{x} is a witness set for x, i.e., we
can determine whether x is in the margin of any hypothesis
h ∈ H by looking at labels that h assigns to points in w(x).
We only consider the case where h(x) = 0, since the
h(x) = 1 case is similar. We claim that x is in the margin
of h if and only if there exists a point in w1(x) that is as-
signed the label 1 by h. Indeed, suppose there exists such a
point. Then since the point lies in U(x) and is assigned the
opposite label as x by h, x must lie in the margin of h. For
the other direction, suppose x lies in the margin of h. Then
there must exist a point x′ ∈ U(x) such that h(x′) = 1,
which means there must be a hypothesis hˆ ∈ M1(x) such
that hˆ ≺x1 h, which means there must exist xˆ ∈ w1(x) such
that h(xˆ) = 1.
We can easily verify, for example, that for the (H,U) pair
defined in Observation 16, the set of minima defined by the
partial orderings above is finite. Indeed, the (equivalence
class of) half-spaces corresponding to the four corners of
the unit cube constitute the minima.
3Here, we think of hypotheses h1 and h2 as the pre-image of
1 (as noted in Section 2), and hence subsets of X .
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4.2. Query complexity of adversarial attacks and its
connection to robust PAC learning
Even though in the literature on (practical) adversarial at-
tacks an adversary is often modelled as an actual algo-
rithm, in the theoretical literature the focus has been on
whether adversarial examples merely exist4. However, one
can say a robust learner is successful if it merely finds a hy-
pothesis that is potentially non-robust in the conventional
sense yet whose adversarial examples are hard to find for
the adversary. To formalize this idea, one needs to define
some notion of “bounded adversary” in a way that enables
the study of the complexity of finding adversarial exam-
ples. Attempts have been made at studying computation-
ally bounded adversaries in certain scenarios (Garg et al.,
2019) but not in the distribution-free setting. Here we
study an adversary’s query complexity. We start by for-
mally defining an adversary and discussing a few different
properties of adversaries.
Definition 24. For an (H,U) pair, an adversary is an algo-
rithmA tasked with the following: given a set S of n points
from the domain, and query access to a hypothesis h ∈ H,
return a set S′ such that (i) each point x′ ∈ S′ is an adver-
sarial point to some point in S and (ii) for every x ∈ S that
has an adversarial point, there exists x′ ∈ S′ such that x′
is an adversarial point for x. If the two conditions hold we
call S′ an admissible attack on S w.r.t. (H,U). We call an
adversary perfect for (H,U) if for every S ⊂ X it outputs
an admissible attack on S. We say that the adversary is
proper if all its queries are in the set
⋃
x∈S U(x).
There have been (successful) attempts (Papernot et al.,
2017; Brendel et al., 2018) at attacking trained neural net-
work models where the adversary was not given any infor-
mation about the gradients, and had to rely solely on black-
box queries to the model. Our definition of the adversary
fits those scenarios. Next, we define the query complexity
of the adversary.
Definition 25. If, for (H,U), there is a function f : N→ N
such that, for any h ∈ H and any set S, the adversary A
will produce an admissible attack S′ after at most f(|S|)
queries, we say that adversary A has query complexity
bounded by f on (H,U). We say that the adversary is effi-
cient if f(n) is polynomial in n.
Note that it is possible that the adversary’s queries are adap-
tive, i.e., the ith point it queries depends on the output of its
first i− 1 queries. A weaker version of an adversary is one
where that is not the case.
Definition 26. An adversary is called non-adaptive if the
set of points it queries is uniquely determined by the set S
before making any queries to h.
4E.g., the definition of adversarial loss in Section 2 is only
concerned with whether an adversarial point exists.
Intuitively, there is a connection between perfect adver-
saries and witness sets because a witness set merely
helps identify the points in S that have adversarial points,
whereas an adversary finds those adversarial points.
Observation 27. If the (H,U) pair exhibits a perfect, non-
adaptive adversary with query complexity f(n), then it also
has witness sets of size f(n).
Finally, we tie everything together by showing that the exis-
tence of a proper, perfect adversary implies that the robust
learning problem has a small sample complexity.
Theorem 28. If the robust learning problem defined by
(H,U) has a perfect, proper, and efficient adversary, then
in the robust realizable-case (LUP (H) = 0) it can be ro-
bustly learned with sample complexity O(t log2(t)) where
t = VC(H)/ǫ2.
Proof Sketch. We adapt the compression-based approach
of (Montasser et al., 2019) to prove the result. Let us as-
sume that we are given a sample S of size |S| = m
that is labeled by some h ∈ H, and want to “compress”
this sample using a small subset K ⊆ S. Let us as-
sume that hˆ is the hypothesis that is reconstructed using
K . For the compression to succeed, we need to have
ℓU(h, x, y) = ℓU(hˆ, x, y) for every (x, y) ∈ S. Given
the perfect proper efficient adversary, we can find all the
adversarial points in S using poly(m) queries. In fact,
we can amend the points corresponding to these queries
to S to create an inflated set, which we call T . Note
that |T | = poly(m). Furthermore, we can now replace
the condition ∀(x, y) ∈ S, ℓU(h, x, y) = ℓU (hˆ, x, y) with
∀(x, y) ∈ T, ℓ0/1(h, x, y) = ℓ0/1(hˆ, x, y) (the latter im-
plies the former because of the definition of perfect ad-
versary). Therefore, our task becomes compressing T
with respect to the standard binary loss, for which we
can use boosting (Schapire, 1990; Moran & Yehudayoff,
2016). There is, however, a catch: we are only allowed
to use points from the given sample in our compressed set,
yet a careless boosting-based approach may use points in
T \ S. Note that since the adversary was proper we have
T ⊂ U(S). Therefore, we can use robust ERM that op-
erates on S as our weak learner as opposed to the regular
ERM that operates on T (Montasser et al., 2019). As a re-
sult, we can encode each weak classifier using O(V C(H))
instances from S. Using a boosting argument, we need
to combine log(|T |) = O(log(m)) weak classifiers to
achieve zero error on the whole sample. Finally, the size
of the compression is O(log(m))V C(H) and the results
follows from the classic connection of compression and
learning (Littlestone & Warmuth, 1986; Montasser et al.,
2019).
We remark that the above theorem improves the result
of (Montasser et al., 2019) when an efficient, perfect, and
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proper adversary exists. This shows an interesting connec-
tion between the difficulty of finding adversarial examples
and that of robust learning. In particular, if the adversar-
ial points can be found easily (at least when measured by
query complexity), then robust learning is almost as easy as
non-robust learning (in the sense of agnostic sample com-
plexity). Or, stated in the contrapositive, if robust learning
is hard, then even if adversarial points exist, finding them
is going to be hard.
It is possible to further extend the result to the agnostic
learning scenario, using the same reduction from agnos-
tic learning to realizable learning that was proposed by
(David et al., 2016) and used in (Montasser et al., 2019).
5. Conclusion
We formalized the problem of black-box certification and
its relation to an adversary with bounded query budget. We
showed the existence of an adversary with small query com-
plexity implies small sample complexity for robust learn-
ing. This suggests that the apparent hardness of robust
learning – compared to standard PAC learning – in terms
of sample complexity may not actually matter as long as
we are dealing with bounded adversaries. It would be in-
teresting to explore other types of adversaries (e.g., non-
proper and/or non-perfect) to see if they lead to efficient ro-
bust learners as well. Another interesting direction is find-
ing scenarios where finite unlabeled data can substitute the
knowledge of the marginal distribution discussed in Sec-
tion 3.
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A. Note on our notation for sets and functions
We use the following notation for sets and functions:
2X the power-set (set of all subsets) ofX
Y X the set of all functions fromX to Y
f : X → Y f is a function fromX to Y
Functions from some setX to some set Y are a special type
of relations betweenX and Y . Thus a function f : X → Y
is a subset ofX × Y , namely
f = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y = f(x)}
If h : X → Y is a (not necessarily binary) classifier, and
P is a probability distribution over X × Y , then the prob-
ability of misclassification is P (errh), where errh is the
complement of h inX × Y , that is
errh = {(x, z) ∈ X × Y | z 6= f(x)} = (X × Y ) \ h
If Y = {0, 1} is a binary label space, then it is also common
to identify classifiers h : X → {0, 1} with a subset of the
domain, namely the set h−1(1), that is the set of points that
is mapped to label 1 under h:
h−1(1) = {x ∈ X | h(x) = 1}
We switch between identifying h with h−1(1) and viewing
h as a subset ofX × Y , depending on which view aids the
simplicity of argument in a given context.
We defined the margin areas of a classifier (with respect to
a perturbation type) again as subsets ofX × Y .
marUh = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | ∃z ∈ U(x) : h(x) 6= h(z)}
Note, that here, if for a given domain point x, we have
(x, y) ∈ marUh for some y ∈ Y , then (x, y′) ∈ marUh for all
y′ ∈ Y . Thus, the sets marUh ⊆ X × Y are not functions.
Rather, they can naturally be identified with their projection
onX , and we again do so if convenient in the context.
The given definitions of errh and mar
U
h , naturally let us
express the robust loss as the probably measure of a subset
ofX × Y :
LUP (h) = P (errh ∪marUh ).
B. Note on measurability
Here, we note that allowing the perturbation type U to be an
arbitrary mapping from the domainX to 2X can easily lead
to the adversarial loss being not measurable, even if U(x)
is a measurable set for every x. Consider the case X = R,
and a distribution P with PX uniform on the interval [0, 2].
Consider a subsetM ⊆ (0, 1) that is not Borel-measurable.
Consider a simple threshold function
f : R→ {0, 1}, f(x) = 1 [x < 1]
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and a the following perturbation type:
U(x) =
{ ∅ if x /∈M
{x+ 1} if x ∈M
Clearly, f is a measurable function, and every set U(x) is
measurable. However, we get marUf = M , that is, the mar-
gin area of f under these perturbations is not measurable,
and therefore the adversarial loss with respect to U is not
measurable. Note that the same phenomenon can occur for
sets U that are always open intervals containing the point x.
With the same function f , for perturbation sets
U(x) =


Br(x) ∩ (0, 1) if x < 1, x /∈M
Br(x) ∩ (1, 2) if x > 1
(0, 2) if x ∈M or x = 1
we getmarUf =M ∪ {1}, which again is not measurable.
We may thus make the following implicit assumptions on
the sets U(x):
• x ∈ U(x) for all x ∈ X
• if X is an uncountable domain, we assume X is
equipped with a separable metric and U(x) = Br(x)
is an open ball around x
Note that the latter assumption implies that marUh is mea-
surable for a measurable predictor h. This can be seen as
follows: It h is a (Borel-)measurable function, then both
h−1(1) = {x ∈ X | h(x) = 1} and h−1(0) = {x ∈
X | h(x) = 0} are measurable sets by definition. Now, if
we consider “blowing up” these sets by adding open balls
around each of their members, we obtain open (as a union
of open sets), and thus measurable sets:
M1r :=
⋃
x∈h−1(1)
Br(x)
and
M0r :=
⋃
x∈h−1(0)
Br(x).
Now the margin area can be expressed as a simple union of
intersections, and is therefore also measurable:
marUh = (M1r ∩ h−1(0)) ∪ (M0r ∩ h−1(1))
Note that this equality depends on the balls as perturba-
tion sets inducing a symmetric relation, that is x ∈ U(z)
if and only if z ∈ U(x). This condition does not hold in
the above counterexample construction. However, this ar-
gument shows it is sufficient (together with openness) for
measurability of the setsmarUh .
C. Proofs and additional results to Section 3
C.1. Some background
We first briefly recall the notions of ǫ-nets and ǫ-
approximations and their role in learning binary hypothe-
sis classes of finite VC-dimension. We will frequently use
these concepts in our proofs in this section.
ǫ-nets and ǫ-approximations (Haussler & Welzl, 1987)
Let Z be some domain set and let G ⊆ 2Z be a collection
of (measurable) subsets of Z and letD be a probability dis-
tribution over Z . Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1). A finite set S ⊆ Z is an
ǫ-net for G with respect toD if
S ∩G 6= ∅
for all G ∈ G with P (G) ≥ ǫ. That is, an ǫ-net “hits” every
set in the collection G that has probability weight at least ǫ.
A finite set S ⊆ Z is an ǫ-approximation for G with respect
toD if ∣∣∣∣P (G)− |G ∩ S||S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
for all G ∈ G. It is well known that, given also δ ∈ (0, 1),
if G has finite VC-dimension, then an iid sample S of size
at least Θ˜
(
VC(G)+log(1/δ)
ǫ
)
from distributionD is an ǫ-net
for G with probability at least (1 − δ) (see, eg, Theorem
28.3 in (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014)); and an iid
sample S of size at least Θ˜
(
VC(G)+log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
from distri-
bution D is an ǫ-approximation for G with probability at
least (1− δ) (we are omitting logarithmic factors here).
Learning VC-classes ((Vapnik & Chervonenkis, 1971;
Valiant, 1984; Blumer et al., 1989) If X is a domain,
Y = {0, 1} is a binary label space, and H ⊆ Y X ⊆
2(X×Y ) is a hypothesis class of finite VC-dimension, then
the class of error sets errH = {errh | h ∈ H}, that is
the class of complements of H, has finite VC-dimension
VC(errH) = VC(H). For distributions P overX × Y , we
get that sufficiently large samples (as indicated above) are
ǫ-nets of errH. Now, if a sample S is an ǫ-net of the class
errH with respect to P , then every function in the version
space VS(H) of S with respect to H has error less than ǫ.
Recall the version space is defined as those functions in H
that have zero error on the points in S, that is
VS(H) = {h ∈ H | L0/1S (h) = 0}.
If P is realizable by H, an empirical risk minimizing
(ERM) learner, will output a hypothesis from the version
space (the version space is non-empty under the realizabil-
ity assumption) and therefore output a predictor of binary
loss at most ǫ (with high probability).
For general (not necessarily realizable) learning, note that
large enough samples S are ǫ-approximation of errH (with
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high probability at least 1−δ as above). This is also referred
to as uniform convergence for the hypothesis classH. Thus,
every function h ∈ H has true loss that is ǫ-close to its
empirical loss on h, and any empirical risk minimizer is a
successful learner forH even in the agnostic case.
With these preparations, we proceed to the proofs of Theo-
rem 7, Theorem 10 and Theorem 30.
C.2. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 7. We recall that the robust loss of a clas-
sifier h with respect to distribution P overX × Y is given
by
LUP (h) = P (errh ∪marUh )
Thus, to show that empirical risk minimization with respect
to the robust loss is a successful learner, we need to guar-
antee that large enough samples are ǫ-approximations for
the class G = {(errh ∪ marUh ) ⊆ X × Y | h ∈ H} of
point-wise unions error and margin regions.
A simple counting argument involving Sauer’s Lemma (see
Chapter 6 in (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014), and ex-
ercises therein) shows that VC(G) ≤ 2D log(D), where
D = VC(H) + VC(HUmar). Thus, a sample of size
Θ˜
(
D logD+log(1/δ)
ǫ2
)
will be an ǫ-approximation of G with
respect to P with probability at least 1− δ over the sample.
Thus any empirical risk minimizer with respect to ℓU is a
successful proper and agnostic robust learner forH.
Proof of Theorem 10. Note that robust realizability means
there exists a h∗ ∈ H with LUP (h∗) = 0 and this implies
L0/1P (h∗) = 0. That is, the distribution is (standard) realiz-
able by H. The above outlined VC-theory tells us that for
an iid sample S of size Θ˜
(
VC(H)+log( 1
δ
)
ǫ
)
guarantees that
all functions in the version space of S (that is all h ∈ H
with LS(h) = 0) have true binary loss at most ǫ (with prob-
ability at least 1 − δ). Now, with access to PX a learner
can remove all hypotheses with P (marUh ) > 0 from the
version space and return any remaining hypothesis. Note
that, since h∗ is assumed to satisfy LUP (h∗) = 0, we have
P (errh∗) = 0 and P (mar
U
h ) = 0, therefore, the pruned
version will contain at least one function. Now, for any
function hp in the the pruned version space, we obtain
LUP (hp) = P (errhp ∪ marUhp)
≤ P (errhp) + P (marUhp)
≤ ǫ+ 0 = ǫ.
Thus, access to the marginal allows for a successful learner
in the robust-realizable case.
Proof of Theorem 12. We will modify the lower bound
construction of Theorem 9 as follows: we add an additional
point x8 to the domain set, which has zero probability mass
under both P 1 and P 2. We set U(x8) = U(x7) = {x7, x8}.
We modify the probability weights of points x1, . . . , x6 un-
der P 1 and P 2 by dividing them by 2 (i.e., all respective de-
nominators in the proof of Theorem 9 become 12, and we
add weight accordingly to x7, so that P
i(x7) = 1/2+1/12
under both distributions. Functions h1 and h2 are extended
to the new point by setting h1(x8) = h2(x8) = 0. Thus,
the indistinguishability phenomenon of the construction re-
mains the same.
Now we add a function hr = 1 [x = x8] to the class H.
This yields P i(errhr) = P
i(x8) = 0, for i ∈ {1, 2}, thus
both distributions are realizable with respect to the 0/1-loss
now. However P i(marUhr ) = 1/2 + 1/12, for i ∈ {1, 2},
thus hr has adversarial loss 1/2+1/12 on both distribution
and the construction thus remains otherwise analogous. We
now have LUP i(hi) = 2/12, thus hr is does not affect the
optimal robust classifier inH.
Additionally, we add the constant 1 function hc to the class
H. For this function (as for any constant classifier) the
margin area is empty, thus the distributions are “margin
realizable” by H. However, we have P i(errhc) = 1, for
i ∈ {1, 2}, thus hc also has adversarial loss 1 on both dis-
tribution and the construction still remains otherwise un-
changed.
C.3. Additional results
C.3.1. 0/1-REALIZABILITY
∃h∗ ∈ H WITH L0/1P (h∗) = 0
Theorem 12 shows that 0/1-realizability does not suffice
for semi-supervised learning with a margin oracle for H.
However, here we show that the following extended margin
oracle does suffice: we assume that the learner has oracle
access to the weights of the setsmarUh , h∆h
′, andmarUh ∩
(h∆h′), for all h, h′ ∈ H, where the sets h∆h′ ⊆ X are
defined as follows:
h∆h′ = {x ∈ X | h(x) 6= h′(x)}.
Theorem 29. Let X be some domain, H a hypothesis
class with finite VC-dimension and U : X → 2X any
perturbation type. If a learner is given additional access
to an extended margin oracle for H, then H is properly
learnable with respect to the robust loss ℓU and the class
of distributions P that are 0/1-realizable by H, that is
we have L0/1P (H) = 0, with labeled sample complexity
O˜(VC(H)+log(1/δ)ǫ ).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 10, since we assume the
distribution to be 0/1-realizable byH, the version space of
a labeled sample of the given size will include only func-
tions with (true) binary loss at most ǫ. The learner can
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choose a function he from this version space. Now, given
the extended margin oracle, the learner can choose a func-
tion hr that minimizes the robust loss with respect to label-
ing function he. That is, the extended margin oracle allows
to find the minimizer in H of the robust loss on a distribu-
tion (PX , he), that shares the marginal with the data gener-
ating distribution P , but labels domain points according to
he.
Let h∗ ∈ H be a function with L0/1P (h∗) = 0. Thus, we
can identify the distribution P with (PX , h
∗). Now we first
show that for any classifier h, the difference between its
robust loss with respect to P = (PX , h
∗) and with respect
to (PX , he) is bounded by ǫ.
Let h ∈ H be given. Then we have
LUP (h) = LU(PX ,h∗)(h)
= PX(mar
U
h ∪ (h∗∆h))
= PX(mar
U
h ) + PX((h
∗∆h) \marUh )
and
LUPX ,he(h) = PX(marUh ∪ (he∆h))
= PX(mar
U
h ) + PX((he∆h) \marUh ).
Thus, we get
|LUP (h)− LUP,he(h)|
≤ |P ((h∗∆h) \marUh )− PX((he∆h) \marUh )|
≤ |P ((h∗∆h) \marUh )− (PX((he∆h∗) \marUh )
+ PX((h
∗∆h) \marUh ))|
≤ |P ((he∆h∗) \marUh )|
≤ P ((he∆h∗) ≤ ǫ.
where the second inequality follows from
(he∆h) ⊆ (he∆h∗) ∪ (h∗∆h),
and thus
(he∆h)\marUh ⊆ ((he∆h∗)\marUh )∪ ((h∗∆h)\marUh ).
Note that |LUP (h) − LUP,he(h)| ≤ ǫ for all h ∈ H implies
that we also have:
| inf
h∈H
LUP (h)− inf
h∈H
LUPX ,he(h)| ≤ ǫ
Thus, for the output hr of the above procedure, we get
LUP (hr) ≤ LUPX ,he(hr) + ǫ
= inf
h∈H
LUPX ,he(h) + ǫ
≤ inf
h∈H
LUP (h) + 2ǫ
Substituting ǫ/2 for ǫ in this argument completes the proof.
C.3.2. 0/1-REALIZABILITY ON A U -CLUSTERABLE
TASK: ∃h∗ ∈ H WITH L0/1P (h∗) = 0 AND
∃f∗ ∈ F WITH LUP (f∗) = 0
We start by observing that the existence of an f∗ ∈ F with
LUP (f∗) = 0 implies that the support of PX is sitting on
U-separated clusters. Note that we do not assume that the
perturbation type U induces a symmetric relation; we can
nevertheless consider the clusters as connected components
of a directed graph where we place a directed edge between
two domain instances x and x′ if and only if x is in the
support of PX and x
′ ∈ U(x). The assumption LUP (f∗) =
0 then implies that these clusters are label-homogeneous.
This observation leads to a simple, yet improper learning
scheme for the robust loss.
We show that, if the distribution is also 0/1-realizable by
H, a leaner that knows that marginal, can return a hypothe-
sis with robust loss at most ǫ. We note that here, the learner
does not return a hypothesis from the class H. In return,
the guarantee is stronger in the sense that the robust loss of
the returned classifier is close to the overall (among all bi-
nary predictors, rather than just those inH) best achievable
robust loss.
Theorem 30. LetX be some domain,H a hypothesis class
with finite VC-dimension and U : X → 2X any perturba-
tion type. If a learner has access to a labeled sample of
size
O˜
(
VC(H) + log 1/δ
ǫ
)
and, additionall has access to PX , then the classF of all bi-
nary predictors is learnable with respect to the robust loss
ℓU and the class of distributions P that are realizable byH
(that is, L0/1P (H) = 0) and robust realizable with respect
to F (that is, LUP (F) = 0).
Proof. Recall that, to avoid measurability issues, we either
assume a countable domain, or, in case of an uncountable
domain, that the perturbation sets are open balls with re-
spect to some separable metric. The arguments below hold
for both cases.
We now start by observing that the existence of an f∗ ∈ F
with LUP (f∗) = 0 implies that the support of PX is sitting
on U-separated clusters. Note that (in the case of a count-
able domain) we do not assume that the perturbation type U
induces a symmetric relation. We derive the clusters as fol-
lows: we define a (directed) graph onX , where we place an
edge between from domain elements x to x′ if and only if x
is in the support of PX and x
′ ∈ U(x). We now let C ⊆ 2X
be the collection of connected components of the induced
undirected graph. Since LUP (f∗) = 0, thus P (marUf∗) = 0,
the function f∗ is label homogeneous on these clusters (ex-
cept, potentially, for subsets of PX -measure 0, and we may
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then identify f∗ with a function that is label homogeneous
on the clusters).
Now, since P is H-realizable, there is an h∗ ∈ H with
L0/1P (h∗) = 0. Note that h∗ is not necessarily label ho-
mogeneous on the clusters (since h∗ may have a positive
robust loss, that is it may be the case that P (marUh∗) > 0).
However, h∗ agrees with f∗ on the support of PX
(except on a set with measure 0), since both functions
have zero binary loss, L0/1P (h∗) = L0/1P (f∗) = 0. Let
supp(PX) denote the support of PX . That is, for any clus-
terC ∈ C, h∗ is label-homogeneous (and in agreementwith
f∗) on the subset C ∩ supp(PX).
Note that, since we assume knowledge of the marginal, we
may assume that a learner knows the collection of clusters
C and the support of PX . We now define a learning scheme
as follows.
As in the proof of Theorem 10, due to the H-realizability
(L0/1P (H) = 0), we know that with high probability over
a large enough sample S, all functions h ∈ VS(H) in the
version space satisfy L0/1P (h) ≤ ǫ. Moreover, due to theH-
realizability, there will exist functions (for example h∗) in
the version space that label the intersectionsC ∩supp(PX)
of the clusters in with the support of PX homogeneously.
Thus, employing the knowledge of PX , the learner can
prune the version space by removing all functions from the
version space that don’t label all sets C ∩ supp(PX) homo-
geneously, and pick a function hp from this pruned version
space.
Now the learner can construct a new classifier fp, that
agrees with hp on the sets C ∩ supp(PX) and labels the
full clusters homogeneously, that is, if x ∈ C ∩ supp(PX)
for some cluster C ∈ C, then we set fp(x′) = hp(x) for all
x′ ∈ C. Now, by construction of fp (recall the definition
of the clusters), we get P (marUfp) = 0. Moreover, we have
P (errfp) ≤ ǫ (inherited from hp since hp and fp agree on
the support of PX ). Thus
LUP (fp) ≤ ǫ ≤ LUP (H) + ǫ,
which is what we needed to show.
D. Proof from Section 4
Proof of Observation 17. We prove this statement for the
case when the certifier is restricted to be deterministic, and
leave the proof of the probabilistic case to future work.
Suppose the entire data distribution is concentrated on one
point, and wlog suppose the point is the origin and has la-
bel 1. Let B be the unit ball centred at the origin. Thus
the certifier’s task is to determine if h passes through B or
not. We construct a scheme for answering the certifier’s
queries in a way so that no matter what sequence of queries
it chooses to ask, once it commits to a verdict, we can find
a halfspace that is consistent with the answers we provided
to the queries, but inconsistent with the certifier’s verdict.
It is easier to work in a dual space using a standard duality
argument, where the dual of a point (a, b) is the line ax +
by + 1 = 0 and vice versa. This duality transform has
the following two useful properties: 1) a point is to the
left of a line if and only if the dual of the point is to the
left of the dual of the line, and 2) a point is inside the unit
ball if and only if its dual does not intersect the unit ball.
Thus in the dual space, the certifier picks a line and asks
whether the hidden point is to its left or right, and needs to
determine if the hidden point is inside the unit ball or not.
Our strategy, then, is to consider the arrangement of lines
created by the certifier’s queries thus far, and locate a cell
that contains a part of B’s circumference. We answer the
certifier’s query as if the point was inside this cell. This cell
will have a non-zero volume whenever the certifier stops,
and we can select a point inside the cell that is inside or
outside B depending on the certifier’s answer. That we can
always find such a cell can be seen with an argument using
induction. For the base case, there are no queries and hence
no lines. Thus the entire place is such a cell. Suppose
we have identified such a cell after seeing m lines. If the
next line does not pass through the cell it still satisfies the
property in question. If the next line does pass through the
cell, it divides the cell into two smaller cells one of which
will satisfy the property.
E. Proof of Theorem 28
We start by providing the definition of sample compression
for adversarially robust learning.
Definition 31 (Adversarially Robust Compression). We
say (H,U) admits robust compression of size k if there ex-
ist a (decoder) function φ : (X × Y )k → Y X such that
the following holds: for every h ∈ H and every SX ⊂ X ,
there exist KX ⊂ SX such that
∀x ∈ SX , ∀z ∈ U(x), φ(K)
∣∣
z
= h
∣∣
z
whereK is the labeled version ofKX (labeled by h).
Note that in the above definition, k = |K| can potentially
depend on the size of the set, m = |SX |. However, this
dependence should be sub-linear (e.g., logarithmic) to later
result in a non-vacuous sample complexity upper bound.
The following theorem draws the connection between com-
pression and robust learning.
Theorem 32. If (H,U) admits an adversarially robust
compression of size k, then the sample complexity of ro-
bust learning of (H,U) in the robustly realizable setting is
O(k log(k/ǫ)/ǫ2).
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Proof. This theorem can be proved in a similar way to that
of classical (non-robust) sample compression proposed by
(Littlestone & Warmuth, 1986). For the proof in the con-
text of robust compression we refer the reader to Lemma
11 in (Montasser et al., 2019).
In order to proceed, we need to show that the existence of a
perfect proper efficient adversary means that a small-sized
compression scheme exists.
Theorem 33. Assume (H,U) has a perfect proper adver-
sary with query complexity f(m). Then (H,U) admits a
compression of size O(V C(H) log(m+ f(m))).
Let us postpone the proof of Theorem 33 for now and com-
plete the proof of Theorem 28.
Proof of Theorem 28. Assume that (H,U) has a perfect,
proper, and efficient adversary. Based on Theorem 33, we
conclude that (H,U) admits a compression scheme of size
O(V C(H) log(m+ f(m))). Furthermore, because the ad-
versary is efficient we have f(m) = poly(m) and there-
fore we conclude that the size of the compression scheme
is O(V C(H) log(m)). We can now use Theorem 32 to
bound the sample complexity of learning. In particular,
it will be enough to have m > Ω(k log(k/ǫ)/ǫ2) where
k = Θ(V C(H) log(m)). Therefore, it will suffice to have
m = Ω(V C(H) log2(V C(H)/ǫ)/ǫ2).
Therefore, it only remains to construct a compression
scheme and prove Theorem 33. For this, we will need to
first define the notion of weak learners in the context of
adversarially robust learning.
Consider the robust empirical risk minimizer (RERM) al-
gorithm for (H,U)which given a labeled sample S outputs
h ∈ H with minimum robust loss on S.
RERM(S) = argmin
H
LUS
(Note that in case of a tie, the RERM algorithm is allowed
to output any minimizer of the robust loss.)
We denote by SX the unlabeled portion of the sample S.
The inflated version of SX with respect to U is defined by
SUX = ∪x∈SXU(x)
Theorem 34 (Weak Learner for Robust Learning). For ev-
ery SX ⊂ X , every probability measure PX over SUX ,
and every h ∈ H, there exists W ⊂ S such that |W | =
O(V C(H)) and L0/1P (RERM(W )) < 1/3. Here S is the
labeled version of SX by h, and P is a distribution over
X × Y with marginal PX and labeled (deterministically)
by h.
Note that in the above theorem,W is not only a subset of
the inflated set, but also a subset of the original set S. This
will become handy when designing a compression scheme,
as we would be allowed to only use the given sample S in
the scheme, not the inflated set.
Proof of Theorem 34. Consider an arbitrary probability
measure PX over the inflated set S
U
X . By standard VC-
theory we know that for a large enough constant C, a sam-
ple S′ ⊂ SUX × Y of size C.V C(H) generated from P will
be a 1/3-approximation of P with respect toH with proba-
bility at least 0.99. Therefore, there exist S′ ⊂ SUX×Y such
that if given to ERM, the robust loss of the resulting hy-
pothesis, L0/1P (ERM(S′)), will be smaller than 1/3. Now
define
W = {(µ(z), y) | (z, y) ∈ S′}
where µ(z) = argminx∈SX{‖x − z‖ | (x, y) ∈ S, z ∈
U(x)} (and we break the ties arbitrarily). By definition
of the RERM algorithm, running RERM on W will have
the effect of running an ERM on S′. Therefore, we can
conclude that LUP (RERM(W )) = L0/1P (ERM(S′)) ≤
1/3.
Now we can use these weak learners along with a boosting
scheme to construct the compression scheme.
Proof of Theorem 33. Recall that we want to show that
there existsKX ⊂ SX such that
∀x ∈ SX , ∀z ∈ U(x), φ(K)
∣∣
z
= h
∣∣
z
where K is the labeled version of KX (labeled by h). We
know that (H,U) has a perfect adversary with query com-
plexity f(m). Let QS be the set of queries that the adver-
sary asks on S to find the adversarial points (so |QS | =
f(m)). Let Q be labeled version of QS (i.e., each query
with its answer from h). We claim that for the compression
to succeed it will be enough to have
∀z ∈ SX ∪QS , φ(K)
∣∣
z
= h
∣∣
z
The reason is that if the two hypotheses have the same
behaviour on T = SX ∪ QS then they should have the
same behaviour on the SUX as well (otherwise the adversary
would not be perfect). Furthermore, because the adversary
is proper, we know that QS ⊂ SUX . In other words, we
just need to compress the subset T instead of SUX . Also, we
know that |T | ≤ m+ f(m).
Black-box Certification and Learning under Adversarial Perturbations
We will use the idea of boosting to do the sample compres-
sion for T . Based on Theorem 34, we know that we have
weak learners that can reach error 1/3 on for any marginal
over T , and we can encode each of these weak classifiers
using a subset W ⊂ S of size O(V C(H)). We can now
use AdaBoost (Schapire & Freund, 2013, Theorem 3.1) to
combine O(log(1/ǫ)) of these classifiers to reach error ǫ.
However, since the labeling of h is deterministic, the er-
ror of the combined classifier will be zero if it is smaller
than 1/(m + f(m)). As a result, we only need to com-
bine log(m + f(m)) weak classifiers each of which using
O(V C(H)) samples. Therefore, the size of the compres-
sion scheme is O(log(m+ f(m))V C(H)).
